

RESPONDING TO GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY THREATS



40%

of the US workforce would be unable to work due to illness during the peak weeks of a severe influenza pandemic (GAO 2017)¹

2x lives lost

If a severe infectious disease pandemic were to occur today, there would be 2x the amount of US battlefield fatalities since 1776 (GAO 2017)¹

\$6 trillion

is what it could cost to contain pandemics (GHRF Commission 2016)²

\$100 trillion

and 10 million lives are projected to be lost by 2050 as a result of antimicrobial resistance (UK Government Review of AMR 2014)³

2.5 billion

illnesses and 2.7 million deaths can be attributed to the top 56 animal transmitted diseases, a critical factor in rising infectious disease (Gebreyes et al 2014)⁴

Ebola. Zika. Pandemic flu. Emerging infectious disease and pandemic threats that historically impacted other geographies now directly endanger American health. As an organization that works directly with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to prevent the spread of deadly outbreaks, PATH has seen firsthand that the United States is unprepared to handle these threats to our national security.

PANDEMICS HAVE DEVASTATING IMPACTS

- **Significant loss of life**—a severe infectious disease pandemic today would cause the death of over 1 million lives; that's twice the amount of US soldiers lost in war since 1776.
- **Disastrous effects on economies**, costing up to US\$6 trillion to contain globally.²
- **Endangering Americans** by contributing to increased instability, drug resistance, and potential resurgence of previously treatable diseases.

AMERICA IS UNPREPARED

- Despite US and World Health Organization member state adoption of the International Health Regulations requiring countries to take specific measures against public health risks with border-crossing potential, today **more than 70 percent of countries are still not properly prepared to address pandemic threats.**⁵
- Research and development of new tools and technologies to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases has not kept pace with the growing need, resulting in a **shortage of ready and appropriate drugs, diagnostics, vaccines, and systems to manage the response.**
- Although a growing number of countries have begun taking steps to respond to the increasing risks of emerging infectious diseases, **sustained political commitment, financial support, technical assistance, and partnerships are needed** to help bring the most vulnerable countries into compliance.



PATH/Aaron Joel Santos

The Cost of Outbreaks: Polio and Zika

Although Nigeria had been declared polio-free, conflict with Boko Haram in its northern region prevented the establishment of proper surveillance programs.

Wild polio virus resurged in 2016, posing a threat to containment of polio worldwide. To keep the highly contagious disease from spreading across West and Central Africa, a massive campaign to vaccinate millions of children was initiated, at a **cost of \$116 million**,⁶ detracting from the impact of the \$228 million the US invested in polio eradication in FY2016.⁷

Once eradicated from 18 countries, the **Zika virus resurged in 2014** in Brazil, due to public health complacency and failed vector control.⁹ It spread rapidly to 26 neighboring countries, **infecting up to 1 million people**⁹ and **costing \$3.5 billion**.¹⁰ Since then, the virus has spread in the United States, with **more than 5,000 confirmed US cases** as of May 2017¹¹ that have put 4,000 pregnant women at risk of infection¹² and resulted in 10% of their babies being born with devastating birth defects.¹³ The urgency of combating Zika led to a **\$1.88 billion appropriation**.¹⁴

CALL TO ACTION

INVEST IN HEALTH SECURITY TO KEEP AMERICANS SAFE

The case for action is clear: **strengthening the capacity of every country to prevent, detect, and respond to health threats is in our national interest.** Leveraging our nation's deep technical expertise in pandemic preparedness and response, the US government has been—and must remain—a key player in handling global threats. Sustained funding for these activities, access to proven health interventions, and investment in tomorrow's health security challenges is critical. Now is not the time to pull back.

US global leadership

US government leadership played a critical role in launching an international response to the 2014 West Africa Ebola outbreak, and in mobilizing more than 55 countries to address pandemic threats under the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). It is **critical for the United States to remain committed to the GHSA, International Health Regulations, and other international efforts** which support core capacities to prevent, detect, and respond. Action must be taken in partnership with the private sector, civil society, multilateral organizations, academia, and public health experts.

Building capacity

Congress's emergency appropriation of \$5.4 billion in FY 2015 not only stopped the deadly Ebola outbreak, but fueled investments worldwide that are making a difference in our ability to mitigate future infectious disease threats. As the Ebola supplemental funding comes to an end in 2018, we are at risk of losing critical frontline defense for imminent outbreaks. **The United States must ensure sustained financing for prevention, emergency response, and global health investments that foster health systems strengthening.**

A national strategy


The United States requires a coherent, coordinated national framework for domestic and global health security that leverages the individual strengths of its agencies—including the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Department of State, Agency for International Development, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Agriculture, and National Institute of Health—to empower a whole-of-government strategy that bolsters self-reliance and accountability for partnering countries.

Investment in R&D

In addition to proven health interventions, it is critical to support R&D for future drugs, diagnostics, vaccines, and systems that can prevent existing and emerging global health threats. The United States must pursue an end-to-end approach that anticipates the need for new technologies as well as strengthens collaboration across agencies. **The US government must also collaborate with the private sector to support R&D for tools that can address diseases that pose the greatest health burden, where commercial markets are the most limited.**

US GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT


Impact on Cameroon's
Emergency Response Center



days to respond to outbreak

(GHSA 2016)

PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT



during the Ebola outbreak

(OCHA 2015)

"The United States affirms its support for the Global Health Security Agenda...to find and stop disease outbreaks around the world."

-Health and Human Services Secretary
Tom Price, World Health Assembly, 2017

CITATIONS

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